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I. INTRODUCTION
 On a small island in New York Harbor, only a few miles from where I am writing, 
stands the Statue of Liberty. It is no accident that this symbol of freedom and 
opportunity stands at what was the nineteenth century gateway to America. New 
York has long been a place where strangers were welcomed, a place for the poor, the 
weak, and the vulnerable. The spirit of New York came to embody all that is meant 
by the American Dream: “a social order in which each man and each woman shall be 
able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be 
recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of 
birth or position.”1
 In the past, the opportunity to reach beyond one’s inherited social status and 
firmly grasp that promise of rebirth, realization, and renewal was readily extended to 
immigrants from all over the world. The possibility of a new life was not a mere 
metaphor. Today, that promise must be extended to a new class of weak and 
article is dedicated to the many New York teenagers living in our poorest communities 
who are being denied an opportunity to participate in the American Dream because 
of poor choices made at a young age.
 New York’s system of adjudication for children under eighteen years of age 
accused of violating the law is unlike that of almost every other state in the nation. 
This article addresses the life-altering repercussions that can affect the future of 
children tried in New York’s adult criminal justice system. Part II discusses New 
York’s statutory age of criminal responsibility and also illustrates how the policy of 
treating children as adults results in missed opportunities to effectively intervene in 
the lives of troubled children. Part III addresses various collateral consequences of 
criminalization, including impediments surrounding educational opportunities, 
employability, housing, and immigration. Part IV discusses the impact of these 
policies on New York’s teenagers. Part V, titled “Judging Children as Children,” 
presents a vision of a twenty-first century model of justice for minors that treats 
children as children, rationally and fairly acknowledging the intellectual, 
psychological, and sociological boundaries of adolescence.
II. NEW YORK’S AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBLITY
 New York’s system of adjudication of children under eighteen accused of violating 
the law is shaped by two statutes, that establish the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility and permit the prosecution of children as young as thirteen in the 
adult criminal justice system. Subdivision one of section 30.00 of the Penal Law 
embodies the statutory defense of infancy and establishes sixteen as the general age 
of criminal responsibility in New York.2 Consequently, children as young as sixteen 
charged with any offense are prosecuted as adults in New York’s courts, and face 
1. James Truslow Adams, The Epic of America 404 (1931).
2. N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(1) (McKinney 2011).
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sentencing according to sentencing parameters applied to adults. Subdivision two of 
Penal Law section 30.003 also permits the automatic prosecution of children as young 
as thirteen as adults if they are charged with certain offenses defined as “ juvenile 
offender” offenses.4 Juvenile offenders are subject to a different range of sentencing 
from those applicable to youth sixteen and over.5
line of adulthood for criminal justice purposes as low as sixteen years of age.6 As a 
result, juvenile offenders, and adolescents sixteen and over, fall outside the jurisdiction 
of the family/juvenile courts. They are statutorily deemed criminally responsible for 
their behavior as adults, their cases are adjudicated in adult criminal courts, and they 
are subject to the same procedures and potential criminalization as adults.7 
Prosecution as an adult, for thirteen-, fourteen-, or fifteen-year-olds charged pursuant 
to the Juvenile Offender Law, as well as adolescents sixteen and seventeen years of 
age, is mandated irrespective of the youth’s background or potential and irrespective 
of the extent of the youth’s involvement in the crime charged. Moreover, they are 
unable to participate in an array of institutionalized social service programming 
available solely pursuant to New York’s Family Court Act.
3. Id. § 30.00(2).
4. Id. § 10.00(18). Under the Juvenile Offender law, a thirteen-year-old is criminally responsible for 
murder in the second degree, and a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old is criminally responsible for murder in 
the second degree, kidnapping in the first degree, arson in the first degree, assault in the first degree, 
manslaughter in the first degree, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, aggravated sexual 
abuse, burglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, arson in the second degree, robbery in 
the first degree, robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, 
where such weapon is possessed on school grounds (as defined by Penal § 220.00(14)), attempted 
murder in the second degree, or attempted kidnapping in the second degree. Id.
5. Id. § 70.05.
6. Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1061 (2010).
7. Juvenile offender cases may be removed to family court. Removal is a limited remedy that is not available 
in  all cases. Upon motion by the defendant pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 180.75(5) (McKinney 
2011), the criminal court may determine that transfer to the family court would serve the interests of 
justice. Id. § 210.43(1)(a). The court  must look at various factors when making this determination, 
including the seriousness of the crime, the extent of the harm caused by the offense, evidence of guilt, 
the history, character, and condition of  the defendant, the purpose of authorizing the sentence, the 
impact of removal on the community, the impact of removal on the public’s confidence with the criminal 
justice system, the attitude of the complainant or victim, and any other facts tending to show 
conviction  in criminal court would serve no useful purpose. Id. § 210.43(2). Prosecutorial consent is 
required when the juvenile offender is  charged with murder in the second degree, rape in the first 
degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, or an armed felony. Id. § 210.43(1)(b). For such offenses, 
the court must also find at least one of three of the following factors:
(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was 
committed; (ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the 
defendant’s participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a 
defense to the prosecution; or (iii) possible deficiencies in the proof of the crime, and, after 
consideration of the factors set forth in subdivision two of this section, the court determined 
that removal of the action to the family court would be in the interests of justice.
 Id.
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 Although New York’s youthful offender (YO) procedure8 provides an avenue for 
the court to exercise discretion upon conviction of youths fourteen through eighteen 
in order to avoid the lifetime stigma of a criminal conviction and the imposition of 
certain mandatory sentences of imprisonment,9 this device does not provide adequate 
protection from exposure to adult procedures and consequences. Adjudicating an 
eligible defendant as a youthful offender does not guarantee that such individual will 
receive the social services that so many of these children require in order to avoid 
further criminal behavior. Moreover, since youthful offender treatment is 
discretionary and a one-time opportunity when granted in the context of a felony 
conviction,10 these children may be at a high risk of future criminalization without 
proper intervention. As for the difficulty that a judge encounters in granting youthful 
offender treatment, one need only look at the literal wording of the statute to 
understand its restrictive nature.11 The fact that some judges may grant YO in a 
somewhat “liberal” manner is not a panacea to the broader issue of the proper age of 
criminal responsibility. Additionally, even if an adult court judge adjudicates a 
defendant as a youthful offender, such a status, while avoiding a felony conviction, 
developmentally sensitive educational, psychological, and social service intervention 
programs that so many of these children require, and which are available solely in the 
family court.
 The Family Court Act, in contrast, authorizes social service interventions for 
youth accused as juvenile delinquents. The legislature recognized that family court 
judges require f lexibility to address the multifaceted needs of court-involved youth. 
Unfortunately, the legislature did not tender these options to adult criminal or 
supreme court judges in either the juvenile offender sentencing scheme or the adult 
sentencing scheme as applicable to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.
 Since the cases of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old children and juvenile offenders 
are processed in the adult criminal courts, the sentencing authority of criminal court 
judges is prescribed by the Penal Law and limited to sanctions which do not include 
access to therapeutic programmatic interventions available under the Family Court 
Act.12 As a result, adult court judges are not statutorily authorized to sentence 
adolescent offenders (“ juvenile offenders,” and sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds) to 
placement in a private voluntary agency or residential treatment center, even though 
one of these might better serve the youth’s needs and better protect society. Moreover, 
because of this lack of statutory authority, programs that offer these services and are 
8. Crim. Proc. § 720.10
9. For the sentencing options associated with youthful offender treatment, see Penal § 60.02; for the 
sealment provisions, see Crim. Proc. § 720.15.
10. Crim. Proc. § 720.10(2)(c). After a youth receives youthful offender treatment for a felony conviction, 
he will not be eligible for this treatment after a subsequent conviction. Id. Youthful offender treatment 
is mandatory only for a first misdemeanor conviction. Id. § 720.20(1)(b).
11. See Id. § 720.1(2)–(3) (limiting who may qualify as an “eligible youth”).
12. See Penal § 60.10.
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willing to accept these children have no mechanism of financial reimbursement from 
the court. Programs amenable to providing these services are required to secure their 
own funding in order to treat adolescent offenders. For example, criminal and 
supreme court judges cannot, under the present statutory scheme, sentence convicted 
adolescent offenders to placement in a program or residential setting that is 
specifically designed to provide developmentally sensitive services such as mentoring, 
socialization skills, family counseling, mental health intervention, and vocational 
and educational counseling. Judges who determine that such rehabilitative services 
are warranted in a given adolescent’s case are left to their own devices and 
improvisational skills to craft a disposition that integrates participation in a program, 
pending a statutorily authorized sentence.
 In sum, as a result of New York’s low age of criminal responsibility and the 
Juvenile Offender Law, many young people who could benefit from the social service 
oriented family court are deprived of an opportunity to receive productive intervention 
only available through the Family Court Act. Alternative-to-incarceration programs 
relied on to provide developmentally sensitive interventions in the adult court are not 
an official part of the system. They are often supported financially by private donors 
and are subject to the fragility and inconsistency of that funding.
 A.  The Family Court Act Provides Judges with the Dispositional Flexibility Necessary 
to Respond to the Cases of Children
 The Family Court Act recognizes that judges require f lexibility when addressing 
the multifaceted needs of court-involved children. Family court judges have wide 
discretion. For example: 
1)  Under the Family Court Act, the court can place a child with a 
private residential or nonresidential program, and thus can create 
a statutory funding stream for reimbursement for the services 
rendered by the aforesaid program;13
2)  With an exception for certain designated felonies, a family court 
judge is not bound by minimum sentences or durations of 
placement;14
3)  “In contrast to Criminal Procedure Law § 170.55(1), which 
provides that a local criminal court may grant an ACD 
[adjournment in contemplation of dismissal] prior to the entry of 
a plea or a verdict, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding an ACD 
may be granted at any time, including at the conclusion of a 
dispositional hearing, so long as the court has not adjudicated 
13. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 353.3(1) (McKinney 2011).
14. Under the Family Court Act section 353.5(3), a respondent must be placed only “where the respondent 
is found to have committed a designated felony act in which the respondent inf licted serious physical 
injury . . . upon another person who is sixty-two years of age or more.” Id. 
1418
JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: RECLAIMING NEW YORK’S PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 
the respondent to be a juvenile delinquent pursuant to Family 
Court Act § 352.1(1)”;15
4)  Under the Family Court Act, a disposition must ref lect the 
needs and best interests of the individual respondents as well as 
the need for protection of the community.16 With the exception 
of designated felony acts, the family court must order the least 
restrictive alternative at disposition;17
5)  The Family Court Act allows the court to remove the child 
from the home of a parent or guardian if the court concludes the 
home is not an appropriate environment for the child and places 
the child with an individual, such as a grandparent or aunt, in 
effect determining that custody should be changed;18
6)  Under the Family Court Act, a juvenile delinquency petition or 
finding can be replaced with a person in need of supervision 
(PINS) petition,19 thus enabling the child to receive the 
probationary and social services attendant to such a finding.20
 Regrettably, the legislature did not afford this f lexibility to criminal or supreme 
court judges in cases involving juvenile offenders and sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds. New York’s approach sharply deviates from the f lexible array of dispositional 
alternatives that have traditionally characterized juvenile adjudications. Additionally, 
uniformly and intractably subjecting sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to the adult 
penal scheme dramatically compromises a judge’s ability to respond to their 
developmental needs. It is paradoxical that, in many instances, those children who 
could most benefit from remedial social services are the very individuals who, by 
virtue of their age, fall outside the parameters of the statutes that establish, fund, and 
implement those programs.
 B. Arrest, Detention, and Adjustment
 New York’s JO Law and its low age of criminal responsibility affect the lens 
under which we view the cases of children below eighteen at each point of contact 
with our justice system, including arrest, confinement, adjudication, and sentencing. 
The Family Court Act provides children with developmentally sensitive pretrial 
protections. For example, when a police officer takes a child subject to the jurisdiction 
15. See In re Sheenah C., 896 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010).
16. Fam. Ct. Act § 352.2(2)(a).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 353.3(1).
19. Id. § 311.4(1)–(2).
20. See id. § 735.
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of the family court into custody, she must immediately notify the parent, the person 
legally responsible for the child, or a person with whom the child resides if the parent 
or person legally responsible is unavailable.21 Pretrial detention takes place in a 
facility certified by the Office of Children and Family Services as a “Juvenile 
Detention Facility.”22 Furthermore, under the Family Court Act, in determining the 
suitability of questioning a child, the child’s age and the presence or absence of his 
parents, or a person legally responsible for the child, are relevant considerations.23
 Finally, the Family Court Act allows the probation service to “adjust” certain 
cases before a petition is filed.24 Under this process, the youth is released provided 
that he complies with conditions set by a probation officer. This process provides 
probation officers with an opportunity to expeditiously link the child to necessary 
services while holding the child accountable for his actions without extensive court 
intervention.
III. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
 A juvenile delinquency finding under the Family Court Act is not a criminal 
conviction. On the other hand, children prosecuted as adults due to New York’s low 
age of criminal responsibility and JO Law are exposed to the lifetime stigma of a 
criminal record. An adolescent’s conviction is more pernicious than an adult’s 
conviction because it can severely undermine a youth’s future before he has an 
opportunity to embark upon a productive adult life. As Professor Frank Zimring 
poignantly stated, “punishing a young offender in ways that significantly diminish 
later life chances compromises the essential core of a youth protection policy.”25
 The collateral consequences of a criminal conviction affect education, 
employment, and housing, perpetually punish children, prevent them from achieving 
their full potential, and may forever compromise their ability to become productive 
members of society. Such burdens may be carried for a lifetime. As Professor Andrew 
Schepard of Hofstra University Law School observed, a juvenile conviction will 
require an offender “to disclose information about his record when applying to 
college, [and] the conviction will show up on background checks when he is applying 
for jobs, a license to practice a profession, and public housing.”26
 Although adult criminal background information has always been open to public 
scrutiny, the facility with which such information can now be publicly accessed has 
increased significantly with the availability of internet-based criminal background 
21. Id. § 305.2(3).
22. Id. § 305.2(4)(c).
23. Id. § 305.2(8); see also Justin Ashenfelter, Note, Coming Clean: The Erosion of Juvenile Miranda Rights in 
New York State, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1503 (2011–12). 
24. Id. § 308.1(2); Id. § 308.1(4) (enumerating crimes for which adjustment is available).
25. Franklin E. Zimring, Youth Violence: Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, in 24 Crime & Justice 
477, 493 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998).
26. Andrew Schepard, Collateral Consequences for Young People Convicted as Adults, 245 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2011).
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checks. Today, a myriad of organizations remove the previously required legwork by 
checking all possible repositories of criminal background information for a nominal 
fee.27 Online background checks gather and consolidate the criminal justice 
information contained in various databases based on nothing more than a name and 
employment, housing, credit, insurance, or service contract. However appropriate 
and relevant this information is to protecting society, knowledge of the convictions 
of those who were minors at the time of the offense significantly ignores and inhibits 
the possibility and potential for a young offender to grow out of criminal and 
delinquent behavior. Below is a brief discussion of some of the collateral consequences 
of a criminal conviction.
 A. Education
 There are many barriers for incarcerated youth who strive to obtain a quality 
education.28 Even if a youth manages to complete high school while incarcerated, 
that individual will face a formidable challenge when seeking higher education. In a 
recent survey, sixty-six percent of responding colleges indicated that they collect 
criminal justice data from all applicants.29 When two-year granting institutions are 
excluded, the number rises to seventy-four percent.30 Juvenile/family court 
adjudications need not be disclosed to colleges. As a result of this disclosure, New 
York children who have been adjudicated and convicted as adults are at a considerable 
disadvantage in the application process, compared to similarly aged applicants 
seeking admission from states where the age of criminal responsibility is higher.
 B. Employment and Influence on Employability
 According to a recent survey in 2010, ninety-two percent of employers used 
criminal background checks regularly in their hiring decisions,31 seventy-three 
percent conducted checks on all job applicants, nineteen percent conducted checks 
27. Erica Goode, Internet Lets a Criminal Past Catch Up Quicker, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2011, at A17, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/us/29records.html.
28. A recent report by the Annie E. Casey Foundation notes that “[r]ecurrent problems include 
overcrowding, frequent movement of students, lack of qualified teachers, an inability to address gaps in 
students’ schooling, and a lack of collaboration with the public school system.” Richard A. Mendel, 
The Annie E. Casey Found., No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile 
Incarceration 25 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids_Full.pdf. 
29. Ctr. for Community Alternatives, The Use of Criminal History Records in College 
Admissions Reconsidered 8 (2010), http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/Reconsidered-
criminal-hist-recs-in-college-admissions.pdf.
30. Id. at 10.
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on selected candidates, and only seven percent did not regularly utilize background 
checks as part of the hiring process.32
 New York City’s “Young Men’s Initiative,” announced by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg on August 4, 2011, acknowledges the severity of this problem. The 
initiative attempts to ameliorate the impact of a criminal conviction on economic 
opportunity by “issu[ing] guidance to its [city] agencies for the consideration of 
criminal record[s] in hiring and licensing.”33 The Mayor instructed the city’s agencies 
to not ask applicants about their criminal history before or during their first 
interview.34 The Executive Order enacting the policy specifically recognizes that 
“obstacles to employment for people with prior criminal convictions and other 
barriers to reentry impair the economic and social vitality of this group, and is 
contrary to public policy.”35
 C. Housing
 In New York, securing affordable housing is a problem that increases exponentially 
for applicants with a criminal history. Property owners are not prohibited from 
discriminating against applicants with criminal convictions and, as such, many 
individuals are at a serious disadvantage in an already daunting endeavor.36 This issue 
is compounded by the fact that a criminal conviction has a deleterious effect not solely 
on the convicted individual, but upon his or her family’s eligibility for public housing. 
For example, the New York City Housing Authority conducts background checks on 
all members of an applicant’s household above the age of sixteen.37 The family is 
deemed ineligible for public housing for prescribed periods of time after the “convicted 
person has served his/her sentence (including the completion of probation and/or 
32. Id. N.Y. Correct. Law § 753(1) (McKinney 2011) (requiring private employers of ten or more people and 
public employers to consider a number of factors before rejecting a job or license application). These factors 
also include the time that elapsed since the offense, the job responsibilities, the age of the applicant at the 
time of the offense, and the time that has elapsed since the offense took place. Correct. § 753(1).
33. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Launches Nation’s Most Comprehensive Effort 




34. Consideration of Criminal Convictions in Hiring, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 151 (Aug. 4, 2011), http://
www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_151.pdf.
35. Id. 
36. See Legal Action Ctr., Are You Someone with HIV/AIDS? An Alcohol or Drug History? A 
Criminal Record? 13 (2007); N.Y.C. Housing Auth., New York City Housing Authority’s 
Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan, App. G at 5–7 (2011) [hereinafter Tenant Selection 
and Assignment Plan], http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/TSAPlan.pdf.
37. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., Guide to Applying for Public Housing 7 (2011), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/nycha/downloads/pdf/070008_pub_hsg_guide.pdf.
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parole and the payment of any fine) with no further convictions or pending charges.”38 
The duration of the ineligibility period is contingent upon the severity of the underlying 
conviction. For example, families are ineligible for public housing for three years after 
the convicted person has completed his or her sentence, including probation and parole 
for “Class B or unclassified misdemeanors,” and families are ineligible for six years 
after “A, B or C felonies.”39
 D. Immigration
 A criminal conviction can have devastating consequences on one’s immigration 
status and may result in deportation. In Padilla v. Kentucky, U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice John Paul Stevens recognized that
[t]he landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the 
last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses 
and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, 
immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses 
and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of 
deportation. The “drastic measure” of deportation or removal is now virtually 
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.40
IV. IMPACT ON NEW YORK’S TEENAGERS
 New York is losing the opportunity to intervene constructively for far too many 
young people who come into contact with law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system. The idea of criminalizing or institutionalizing a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old 
without first making every effort to address the reasons behind the criminal behavior, 
demonstrates a fatal f law in our effort to improve public safety. The number of youths 
below eighteen years of age who come into contact with our adult court system is 
staggering. In New York during 2010, approximately 44,000 arrests of youth below 
eighteen years of age were adjudicated pursuant to laws and sentences initially designed 
for adults (including 808 juvenile offenders below the age of sixteen).41
 It has been suggested that New York’s system of adjudicating minors already 
takes into account the youth, immaturity, and diminished judgment of defendants 
under eighteen years of age. Those who adopt this argument point to the availability 
of youthful offender treatment and data that demonstrates that in 2010, for example, 
a significant number of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds (ninety-four percent) who 
38. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., Applications and Tenancy Administration Department Manual 
(2009), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/table-nycha_standards_of_admission.pdf.
39. See Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan, supra note 36.
40. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006) 
(listing criminal offenses that render aliens ineligible for admission into the United States); 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a) (2006) (listing criminal offenses that subject aliens to deportation). 
41. N.Y. Dep’t. of Criminal Justice Servs., New York State Dispositions of Arrests in 2010 
Involving Youth at App. A (2010).
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were arrested and processed in New York’s criminal courts received dispositions that 
did not result in a criminal record.
 However, a review of the data also shows that when factoring out the number of 
cases that were dismissed or those that resulted in convictions for non-criminal offenses 
(violations), as well as the number of acquittals, a different picture presents itself. In 
2010, a total of 9141 youth under eighteen were convicted of a crime.42 Of those 
convicted, 6596 (including 237 juvenile offenders under sixteen) received youthful 
offender treatment; the remaining 2545 (including 112 juvenile offenders under sixteen) 
incurred a criminal record.43 Thus, twenty-eight percent of youth who were actually 
convicted of a crime in 2010 were criminalized and received a criminal record.
 In terms of the suggested ameliorative impact of the Youthful Offender Law, as 
stated previously, the YO Law does not sufficiently address nor does it provide the 
developmentally sensitive remedies or interventions that so many of these children 
Act. As a result, youthful offender treatment often results in ignoring the issues that 
bring young offenders to court in the first place. Troubled children who violate the 
law should receive appropriate therapeutic intervention at the earliest opportunity.
 The practice of dismissing tens of thousands of cases of youth sixteen and 
seventeen years of age is not necessarily consistent with a system that takes into 
consideration the developmental differences of children.44 In many of these cases, we 
may be missing an opportunity to effectively address the reasons that brought those 
children into contact with the system. Such intervention is available through the 
Family Court Act where the probation department has the authority to adjust cases 
and hold children accountable swiftly, without extensive court intervention.
 In any event, there are a number of unanswered questions raised by the available 
data. For example, it is unclear whether, for cases dismissed, we are properly 
addressing issues presented by youth that could result in future crime and 
criminalization if unaddressed. It is unclear whether adjournments in contemplation 
of dismissal are considered adjournments at the time of dismissal, without a follow 
up to determine whether the conditions of dismissal were eventually met. Further, it 
would be helpful to obtain data on the recidivism rates of youth who receive youthful 
offender treatment and what services, if any, they were afforded. In sum, without this 
information, it is difficult to agree with the contention that our current system of 
adjudication of cases involving young offenders provides youth better treatment in 
New York’s adult courts than what is available to them in family court.
 It is also argued that the need to raise the age of criminal responsibility ignores 
the value of the alternative-to-incarceration programs that currently exist in criminal 
court. Although these programs are laudable, they are not an institutionalized part 
of the system, and depend upon the judge’s individual policies and predispositions 
and on funding from private donors.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. (indicating that 23,888 cases of youth under the age of eighteen were dismissed in 2010).
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 The societal and economic ramifications of prosecuting tens of thousands of 
children as adults must be scrutinized as part of any comprehensive juvenile justice 
reform agenda. If we are to adeptly confront juvenile crime in New York, we must 
intervene productively in the lives of troubled children at the earliest possible 
opportunity. This will require a statewide shift in policy and legal practice from a 
system that judges children as adults to one that judges children as children.
V. JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN
 A. Theory of Reform
 A crucial element necessary to remedy the negative consequences of the policy of 
trying children as adults is legislation that will raise the age of criminal responsibility 
to eighteen. This would bring New York into conformity with the overwhelming 
national consensus that children under the age of eighteen, in the first instance, 
should have their cases referred to a family/juvenile court, and only those children 
whose crimes are so horrendous and backgrounds so disturbed that they would not 
be amenable to the services of these courts, should be tried in adult criminal courts 
where they could be exposed to greater periods of secure treatment.
 In his treatise American Youth Violence, Professor Zimring stated, “The principal 
objective of policy in the adjudication and sentencing of minors is to avoid damaging 
the young person’s development into an adulthood of full potential and free choice; 
thus the label for this type of policy is ‘room to reform.’”45
 The crux of this approach is to afford children an opportunity to learn from their 
mistakes without posing an unjustifiable risk to public safety so that, as these children 
mature, they may become contributing members of our society. Our current 
sentencing structure does not adequately accommodate these interests because it all 
too often results in the unnecessary criminalization of a significant number of 
children who are then denied an opportunity to redeem themselves. Altering the way 
we prosecute minors is more than merely a matter of principle. Increasing the age of 
criminal responsibility to eighteen and opening the therapeutic services of the family 
court to all children will transform the way we prosecute minors from an intrinsically 
punitive approach to a rehabilitative-based model. This shift in culture, policy, and 
practice will reduce the unnecessary criminalization of many children currently 
subject to adult court jurisdiction and mitigate the impact of the collateral 
consequences of juvenile misconduct.
 This approach is consistent with current U.S. Supreme Court juvenile justice 
jurisprudence and is reflected in a series of cases following Roper v. Simmons.46 The 
45. Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence 142 (1998).
46. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also J.D.B v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding that “a child’s age 
properly informs the Miranda custody analysis” and that “[a] child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological 
fact.’ It is a fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.’ Such 
conclusions apply broadly to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone who was a child 
once himself, including any police officer or judge.”) (citations omitted); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011 (2010) (holding that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence 
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Supreme Court held in Roper that it is unconstitutional to execute anyone younger 
than eighteen years of age.47 Justice Anthony Kennedy, speaking for a plurality of the 
Court, reasoned, “From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the 
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.”48
 The Department of Justice, the Federal Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and The Brookings Institution have all issued reports confirming the 
position that prosecuting minors as adults in adult criminal courts is ineffective from 
both a rehabilitative and a public safety perspective.49 In fact, these studies have 
found that young people tried in adult court are much more likely to reoffend. 
Equally revealing is a research project sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation that 
compared a sample of youth cases adjudicated in New York with a proportionate 
sample of youth cases (for similar offenses) in New Jersey, where the age of criminal 
responsibility is eighteen. The researchers found that youth prosecuted in the adult 
courts of New York were eighty-five percent more likely to be re-arrested for violent 
crimes than those prosecuted in the New Jersey juvenile courts, and that they were 
forty-four percent more likely to be re-arrested for felony property crimes.50
 B. Proposed New York Model for the Adjudication of Youth 
 A model of justice for minors in New York, in order to properly address the needs 
of children while protecting the safety of the community, must accomplish four 
objectives:
on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide” and that the State must give “defendants like 
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”). The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Miller v. Alabama, 63 
So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10–9646), 
and Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 (2011), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs, 80 U.S.L.W. 3275 
(U.S. Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10–9647), two cases challenging the constitutionality under the Eighth 
Amendment of life sentences without parole imposed on two juvenile defendants convicted of first 
degree murder and felony murder. Both juveniles were fourteen-years-old at the time of the commission 
of the crimes. In both states, the life without parole sentences was mandatory upon conviction. See 
Miller, 63 So. 3d 676; Jackson, 2011 Ark. 49.
47. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
48. Id. at 570.
49. See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, Office of 
Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention ( June 2010), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/220595.pdf; Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies 
Facilitating the Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System, 56 Morbidity & Mortality 
Weekly Report 1 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5609.pdf; Laurence Steinberg & 
Ron Haskins, Brookings, Keeping Adolescents Out of Prison (2008), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/fall_juvenile_justics_haskins/fall_juvenile_justice_haskins.pdf.
50. See Macarthur Found., Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile 
Justice, The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Adult 
Criminal Court (2006), http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue_brief_5.pdf.
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strategy of prosecution that serves to identify, more precisely, 
dangerous, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders;
primarily focused on education, rehabilitation, and reentry;
treatment, incorporating and institutionalizing participation in 
alternative-to-incarceration programs and developmentally 
sensitive programming for those juveniles most likely to benefit 
from that mode of intervention; and
a felony conviction from those juveniles who have demonstrated 
that they have conformed their behavior to society’s standards 
following conviction and/or incarceration.
 The model outlined below achieves these goals while embodying existing legal 
structures particular to New York:
sixteen to eighteen years of age.
against them will be subject to the original jurisdiction of the 
family court. However, youth under sixteen years of age who are 
charged with designated offenses, currently defined by the 
Juvenile Offender Law, can be transferred to adult criminal 
court after a judicial amenability hearing. Further, no youth 
under fourteen years of age can be transferred to the adult court 
unless it can be established by clear and convincing evidence 
that such a youth is competent to stand and assist in the 
proceedings against him. In no event may a child under thirteen 
years of age be transferred to the adult criminal court.
juvenile offender structure of indeterminate sentences or, in the 
discretion of the adult sentencing judge, adjudicated as if they 
were in the family court. (Judges will retain the option to grant 
YO treatment.)
designated as juvenile offender offenses, can be prosecuted 
automatically in adult court in the same manner as the current 
Juvenile Offender Law provides. However, after a judicial 
hearing, an adult court judge shall have the discretion to: (a) 
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transfer the case to the family court; (b) upon conviction, 
sentence a sixteen- and seventeen-year-old as if he was 
adjudicated in the family court; (c) sentence such sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-old according to the indeterminate sentencing 
structure currently provided for juvenile offenders; or (d) 
sentence such sixteen- and seventeen-year-old under the law as 
currently applied to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.
juvenile offender offense shall be subject to the original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the family court.
eighteen, an offender may apply for expungement of his 
conviction at the expiration of five years from the date of his 
conviction, satisfactory completion of probation, parole, 
supervised release, and payment of any fines imposed or 
restitution ordered, whichever is later, provided that an offender 
can establish that he was crime-free for that period and can 
demonstrate his capacity to be a law abiding citizen.
 The goal is to provide maximum sentencing f lexibility and enhance judicial 
responsiveness to the cases of youth under the age of eighteen convicted in adult 
criminal courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
 New York’s juvenile and criminal justice systems are at a pivotal crossroads. Some 
refer to this as a watershed moment, others a crisis. I prefer to view our current 
posture as a rare and valuable opportunity. Efforts have already begun to improve 
the manner in which children are treated in juvenile and family courts and when 
they are placed in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services. Before 
his election as governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo released an Urban Agenda, 
which contained a plan to “Reform New York’s Broken Juvenile Justice System.”51 
The plan called for, among other reforms, the imprisonment of only those juveniles 
who pose a risk to public safety, improvement of the conditions of confinement, and 
greater reliance on community-based programming. Governor Cuomo’s 2011–2012 
state budget “included provisions specifically designed to discourage the unnecessary 
or inappropriate use of juvenile detention and expand funding for effective alternative 
to detention programming and services.”52 His 2012–2013 Executive Budget provides 
51. See Andrew Cuomo, Reform New York’s Broken Juvenile Justice System, 6 Urb. Agenda: The New NY 
Agenda 161, 161–74 (2010), http://www.andrewcuomo.com/system/storage/6/5b/2/1183/andrew_
cuomo_urban_agenda.pdf.
52. Detention Reform in New York State, Office of Children and Family Services, http://ocfs.ny.gov/
main/detention_reform/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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for “closing costly State facilities and providing more appropriate placements and 
services to youth from New York City within New York City-based facilities.”53
 Mayor Bloomberg, in announcing his Young Men’s Initiative, reiterated New 
York City’s juvenile justice plan. According to the August 4, 2011 announcement:
The City will advocate for state juvenile justice reforms to allow young people 
to remain in community-based alternatives to detention in New York City, 
while also investing $6 million to expand and strengthen the continuum of 
local programming for 100 youth who would otherwise be sent to OCFS-run 
or–contracted facilities. . . . New investment of $9 million will enable the 
Department of Corrections to undertake comprehensive restructuring of in-jail 
services to inmates ages 16–18 to better prepare them for success upon release.54
 On September 21, 2011, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman announced a juvenile 
justice proposal raising the age of criminal responsibility for young offenders accused 
of non-violent offenses.55 The governor’s plan, the city’s plan, and the chief judge’s 
proposal are critical steps in the right direction and should be treated as integral 
components in an overarching strategy to transform juvenile justice in New York.56
 New York must capitalize on this progressive and propitious moment; the 
legislature must decisively act to replace the current, unyielding statutory structure 
for children under eighteen years of age and embrace a robust, evidence-based justice 
system that judges children as children. All New Yorkers would benefit from laws 
that make psychological, scientific, economic, and common sense in the context of 
adolescent offenses. Such laws must recognize the developmental differences of 
children, authorize judicial f lexibility in response to their misconduct, incorporate 
meaningful educational and rehabilitative programming, and, above all, provide 
room to reform.
 There cannot be true systemic reform of New York’s juvenile justice system 
unless New York sets a just and rational age of criminal responsibility. Extending 
family court jurisdiction to children up to eighteen years of age and expanding 
adjudicative alternatives, will result in fewer children criminalized for mistakes made 
while exceedingly young and developmentally immature. We have always had the 
responsibility, as a society, to ensure the promise of a productive future for our 
children. We now have the perfect opportunity to dismantle unwarranted obstacles 
53. Office of Children and Family Services, New York State: Division of Budget, http://publications.
budget.ny.gov/eBudget1213/agencyPresentations/appropData/ChildrenandFamilyServicesOfficeof.
html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
54. See Press Release, supra note 33.
55. See Judge Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge of the State of New York, Speech at Citizen’s Crime Commission 
(Sept. 21, 2011), available at http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/Lippman110921.pdf.
56. As part of his proposal, the chief judge announced the establishment of “adolescent intervention 
criminal court parts dedicated exclusively to handling the cases of young people ages 16 and 17.” Id. at 
12. He explained that “[c]ases involving nonviolent offenses will be steered to specially-trained criminal 
court judges who both understand the legal and psychological issues involving troubled adolescents and 
are familiar with the broad range of age-appropriate services and interventions designed specifically to 
meet the needs and risks posed by these young adults.” Id.
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to that future by fixing the f laws in our juvenile justice system. With responsibility 
and opportunity thus aligned, now is the time to act progressively, appreciate that 
children’s perceptions and behaviors are not equivalent to those of an adult, and 
children. The American Dream demands no less.
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Appendix
New York State Dispositions of Arrests in 2010 Involving Youth
Arrest Group 2010
N %
16-17 Year Olds Total Dispositions 42,801 100.0%
Total Not Sealed 2,433 5.7%
Convicted-Felony 1,151 2.7%
Convicted-Misdemeanor 1,282 3.0%
Total Sealed 40,368 94.3%
Convicted-Non Criminal Offense 9,388 21.9%




Juvenile Offenders Total Dispositions 808 100.0%
Total Not Sealed 112 13.9%
Convicted-Felony 109 13.5%
Convicted-Misdemeanor 3 .4%
Total Sealed 696 86.1%
Convicted-Non Criminal Offense 1 .1%
Youthful Offender 237 29.3%
Acquitted 6 .7%
Dismissed 239 29.6%
Removed to Family Court 192 23.8%
Other 21 2.6%
DCJS, CCH as of 9-28-11.
